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Abstract 
Extending the period of the market exclusivity and responding properly to the recent agglomeration of patent 
expiries are pivotal to the success of pharmaceutical companies. Declining R&D productivity, rising costs of commer‑
cialization, near‑term patent expirations for many top‑selling drugs are forcing companies to adopt new systems to 
introduce innovative products to market and to focus on strategies that increase the returns from the existing prod‑
uct portfolio. This systematic review explores various strategic and tactical management approaches by synthesizing 
the relevant literature and practical examples on patent expiration strategies. It further discusses how the mix of com‑
petition policies and strategic instruments can be used to maintain declining revenue streams from the blockbuster 
business model of the pharmaceutical industry. The review provides a comprehensive overview of the research on 
various strategies, offers both theoretical and practical guidelines for strategy transformation that companies can use 
to prolong the market exclusivity, and identifies knowledge gaps that needed to be addressed in order to improve 
efficiency in policy design.
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Background
Ensuring the long-term profitability and revenue upon 
launching of new drugs raises serious concerns for the 
involved parties in the pharmaceutical industry. In many 
industries, the loss of patent-protected exclusivity is 
known to be followed by severe losses in sales and profit 
to incumbent companies. When the patent protection 
expires, generic manufacturers enter the market with 
drugs that are equivalent to the innovator’s drug, but typ-
ically at a significantly lower price (Pearce 2006). The 
investigation carried out by European Commission has 
shown that the average generic price 2  years after its 
entry is around 40 % below the price of the former brand 
name products (European Commission 2009). This helps 
to ease pressure on public health budgets, contributes to 
increased consumer welfare and creates incentives for 
future research, but the innovator-company1 is con-
1 The innovator-company, research-driven company, brand owner and 
incumbent are synonymous.
fronted with challenges as a result of drastically falling 
revenues. The sales dynamics of Pfizer’s Lipitor®, for-
merly known as the best-selling prescription drug in his-
tory, show a dramatic decrease in sales, once the period 
of market exclusivity is exhausted in 2012 (Fig. 1). 
Against this background, a dependence on patent-
protected assets means that the pharmaceutical industry 
relies on repeated R&D successes, whereby the risk is not 
evenly spread throughout the sector.
The immediate decline in revenue after the patent expi-
ration is referred to as “patent cliff” (Jimenez 2012). Patent 
cliffs are one of the major issues facing the pharmaceutical 
industry, as the major blockbuster drugs (i.e. the annual 
global revenue greater than $1 billion) typically account 
for a large percentage of company turnovers. A number 
of blockbuster drugs have lost their patent protection in 
recent years and more will do so in upcoming years. The 
loss of exclusivity with regard to one or more important 
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products can have a significant negative impact on the 
company’s performance and is forcing “Big Pharma” to 
look for new revenue streams. There is no doubt that pat-
ent expirations triggered some of the dramatic merger and 
acquisition announcements that have occurred over the 
past years (Mittra 2007). A number of selected major pat-
ent expiries are given in Table 1. It becomes evident that 
several pharmaceutical companies will be confronted with 
another big wave of patent expiration within next years.
Consequently, the current “blockbuster business model” is 
designed in a manner that the innovator-company is guar-
anteed to lose the core business portfolio every 10–12 years 
after market entry. The impending patent cliff is set to erode 
more than $100 billion in sales for drugs going off-patent 
in the coming years, leaving a financial vacuum for affected 
companies (Denoon and Vollebregt 2010). While the first 
wave of patent cliff left deep marks on the operating results 
and financial position, pharmaceutical companies now seem 
to be better prepared to face the upcoming second wave 
of patent cliff. But still, as it becomes increasingly impor-
tant to defend revenues from an existing product portfolio 
and slow down the sales losses associated with the market 
entry of generics, there is a need to better understand and 
critically review the strategic options for research-driven 
pharmaceutical companies. Although, there is no one-size-
fits-all solution to entirely prevent the decline in revenue, 
the overall financial picture on choosing the adequate and 
carefully implemented strategy will turn out to be more 
favorable than that of unwisely implemented strategy. In 
view of these concerns, this paper attempts to address the 
ongoing challenges of patent cliff at the interface of price-
based competition and innovation policy. Various strate-
gic aspects are brought together, reviewed and synthesized 
in order to derive meaningful conclusions and options for 
action based on this approach. A broad range of literature 
was assessed to answer a set of questions related to strate-
gic choices and how other strand of innovation research 
may be integrated to sustain the competitiveness of branded 
product beyond the end of market exclusivity. The resulting 
framework aims at facilitating the decision-making process 
regarding the identification of appropriate strategies and 
consensus-building in the organization.
The paper is organized as follows: in “The pharma 
industry: an interesting avenue for designing strategies” 
section, a brief background on the business landscape of 
the pharmaceutical industries is provided, and the driv-
ing forces behind patent cliff and the impact of generic 
entry for innovator-companies are discussed. In “Stra-
tegic choices in the case of patent cliff” section, several 
strategic options to mitigate the impact of patent cliff are 
summarized and critically reflected. Reflecting on these 
findings, the paper offers insight into how these interre-
lated strategic building blocks interact with each other 
to create a basis for strategic realignment. “Conclusions” 
section provides summary and concluding remarks.
The pharma industry: an interesting avenue 
for designing strategies
The pharmaceutical industry has a unique approach to 
its research and development compared to other indus-





















Fig. 1 Worldwide revenue profiles of Pfizer’s Lipitor® 2003–2014 
(Source: annual and financial report from Pfizer)
Table 1 Patent expiry of blockbuster drug in 2016 [Source: IMS (2012)]
Patent expirations dates are subject to change due to patent litigation, additional patents and other market exclusivities. Patent expirations do not imply immediate 
generic availability
Drug (trade name) Date of expiration/country Company Application area
Alimta® 2016/US Eli Lilly Cancer
Benicar® 2016/US Daiichi Sankyo Blood pressure medication
Benicar HTC® 2016/US Daiichi Sankyo Blood pressure medication
Crestor® 2016/US Astra Zeneca Lowering LDL cholesterol
Cubicin® 2016/US Merck Bacterial infection
Zetia® 2016/US Merck Lowering LDL cholesterol
Baraclude® 2016/JP Bristol–Myers Squibb Antiviral medication (hepatitis B virus)
Glivec® 2016/EU Novartis Myeloid leukemia
Vfend® 2016/EU Pfizer Antifungal medication
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regulated and is characterized by an increasing level of 
product complexity and quality requirements (Grabowski 
2004). It generally takes up more than 10  years and at 
least $1 billion to successfully develop and achieve a mar-
ket approval of a new blockbuster drug (efpia 2014). The 
long development and testing cycles together with uncer-
tain prospects for commercial success make it demand-
ing to delay planning and decision making processes 
within an organization.
Over the years, the pharmaceutical industry has con-
stantly adapted its business model towards the develop-
ment of a single drug that targets a broader population. 
This approach has contributed to important advances 
in pharmacology to treat a wide spectrum of diseases 
while ignoring the patient’s individual biology. How-
ever, as many companies are conducting researches in 
similar indication areas and working on influencing the 
same enzyme activity or the interaction with receptors, 
it seems opportune to file a patent application as early as 
possible for the discovered drug candidate. This approach 
has the disadvantage that the patent expiration is 
expected to occur much earlier than usual and the effec-
tive market life of drugs is significantly reduced (Hemp-
hill and Sampat 2012). It takes an average of 12–13 years 
to complete the research and development activities, 
from the initial patent filing to the regulatory approval of 
new drug, thereby reducing the effective time of market 
exclusivity to 7–8 years (efpia 2014). Grabowski and Moe 
(2008) emphasized that the shortened exclusivity period 
offers “insufficient time for most new drugs to recoup the 
up-front R&D costs and earn a positive return on this 
investment”. Subsequently, reducing the time necessary 
to develop and commercialize the product is one of the 
key success parameters. However, as the innovator-com-
panies generally have a comparatively limited portfolio of 
innovative products in their pipeline, they can “no longer 
simply allow post-patent profits to be eroded and rely on 
new, patented products to replace their lost revenues” 
(Bruce 2003). In this context, strategic behavior can be 
expected in a legal framework to promote lifecycle exten-
sion strategies. A steady communication between the 
health care providers and representative of the pharma-
ceutical industry is seen as an essential element in mak-
ing the health care more affordable for the payers and 
profitable for the industry. Thus, the patent cliff might 
provide a unique opportunity for the participant in the 
current healthcare system to collaborate and reinvent the 
current model of drug discovery and drug marketing for 
the sustainable development of the whole industry sector.
Consequently, a considerable amount of efforts has 
been directed towards elaborating strategies for dealing 
with diversity. Despite the high organizational and strate-
gic expenditure, there is still a widespread uncertainty as 
to what degree the implemented strategies can contrib-
ute to coping with the complexity. It is considered that 
the subsequent decline in revenue upon patent expiry 
is inevitable, but the introduction of new business logic 
and an analytical approach to value capturing will lead to 
higher efficiency levels of certain process steps.
Factors driving the patent cliff
There are several reasons for generic entry and the asso-
ciated patent cliff. Traditionally, the innovator-companies 
have attempted to replace the blockbusters with new 
drugs from their pipeline to offset the looming decline 
in sales. However, the R&D productivity of the pharma-
ceutical industry has declined continuously over the last 
decade accompanied by increasing costs of bringing new 
drug to market and delaying of drug approval processes 
by government agencies (Pammolli et  al. 2011). Such 
maturity problems result from the fact that the compa-
nies have struggled to develop and market products that 
are effective enough to compete with existing product 
ranges and meet regulatory requirements (Mittra and 
Tait 2012). The shrinking pipeline of research-driven 
pharmaceutical companies and the generic competi-
tion have caused them to deploy a range of strategic 
approaches (Paul et  al. 2010), such as the acquisition of 
biotech companies to refill their R&D pipelines (James 
2002). For instance, Pfizer acquired Wyeth Pharmaceu-
ticals in 2009 for $68 billion upon nearing the patent 
expiry of Lipitor and not having a proper replacement in 
company’s innovation pipeline (Malik 2009). The ration-
ale behind such acquisition is to enhance the earnings 
performance in the cliff period, to increase breadth and 
depth of its portfolio into biologics and vaccines and to 
diversify its source of revenue by investing in comple-
mentary businesses.
The Hatch–Waxman Act, also known as the Drug Price 
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, in 1984 
have changed the dynamics of generic entry on branded 
drugs. It intended to expedite generic drug approval and 
to encourage generic participation in the prescription 
drug industry and has positively contributed to the crea-
tion of modern generic drug industry in US (Grabowski 
and Vernon 2000). Title I of this legislation established 
the Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) process, 
which grants a 180-days market exclusivity period to 
the first generic manufacturers who successfully files an 
ANDA. Under this legislation, a manufacturer only needs 
to demonstrate the bioequivalence of the drug. Before its 
adoption, there has been no streamlined drug approval 
process for generics and generic suppliers were obliged 
to go through the same costly and time-consuming clini-
cal trials to obtain a market approval. This incentive has 
driven the generic competition, promoting the prompt 
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entry of generics to the market. Moreover, the number of 
generic entrants is determined by pre-expiration brand 
revenue, length of market exclusivity period and the 
ease of manufacturing (Scott Morton 2000; Grabowski 
and Kyle 2007). Naturally higher sales and shorter mar-
ket exclusivity periods for the branded drug attract more 
generic entry. Additionally, the gradual decrease in mar-
ket share can be linked with branded drug withdrawing 
the pre-expiration brand advertising.
The evolving payer initiatives to reward generic use 
have also led to the erosion of branded drugs. Payers are 
becoming more effective in their efforts to influence the 
way prescriptions are issued and dispensed by pharma-
cists (Tuttle et al. 2004). In response to rising healthcare 
spending, governments in developed economies are sup-
portive towards generic production to keep costs under 
control and to make public health system sustainable. 
For instance, there exist policies supporting the sale of 
generic medicines by obliging pharmacists to always 
dispense the cheapest product (European Commission 
2009). This may lead to a higher generic share. In addi-
tion, the increasing number of antitrust investigations 
and monitoring of patent settlements between phar-
maceutical companies that might violate the competi-
tion law put pressure on innovator-company to refrain 
from applying generic-entry-delaying, anti-competitive 
practices such as reaching the pay-for-delay agreements 
(OECD 2014). Growing pressure from the healthcare 
regulatory authorities and the growth of managed care 
organizations have intensified price competition sig-
nificantly in the United States and in varying degrees 
in some other countries. Shortcomings in the regula-
tory framework, which does not favor streamlined trials 
for scrutinizing added value of novel medicine and the 
increasing efficiency of generic competition in launch-
ing and marketing of new drugs, are the dynamic force 
behind the patent cliff.
In addition, a greater understanding in the molecular 
basis of human disease and pharmacogenomics has led to 
the emergence of therapeutic interventions tailor-made 
for stratified group of patients. Such medicines are likely 
to improve clinical outcomes and increase patient safety, 
which the current blockbuster drug struggles to deliver. 
Drugs that target at smaller patient population have 
already achieved the market breakthrough. Such trans-
formation would require a fundamental restructuring 
and re-tooling in the drug discovery and development.
Impact of generic entry for the innovator‑company
Generic entry has consequences for many different mar-
ket players. It leads to substantial changes in the aver-
age price of drug, thereby shifting the competition focus 
from monopoly towards competition based on price. 
Therefore, innovator-companies are forced to imple-
ment profit-raising measures by either adapting the 
prices of pharmaceuticals sold under its brand name or 
finding new source of profit, ideally in the form of new 
blockbuster drugs. Eli Lilly’s anti-depressant Prozac® lost 
about 70 % of its market share within the first 20 weeks 
of the market entry of its replica (Druss et al. 2004). Such 
rapid revenue loss for innovator-company calls for the 
incorporation of sophisticated product lifecycle manage-
ment, which allows for maximizing a product’s lifetime 
value through optimal use of patent system (Prajapati 
et al. 2013).
Two major events have emerged over the course of 
the years to respond to this new economic environment. 
Firstly, patent cliff induced the pharmaceutical industry 
into a new wave of product innovation. Competition by 
generics can be regarded as a dynamic force, which stim-
ulates pharmaceutical companies to continue to invest in 
the research and development of innovative treatments 
(European Commission 2009). Manufacturers of generic 
products typically invest significantly less in R&D than 
the innovator-company and are accordingly able to price 
their products significantly lower than branded product. 
In the pharmaceutical industry, the end of patent life is 
a part of the life cycle. The “low hanging fruits” in drug 
development have been picked to a large extent (Williams 
2011) and it is necessary to protect their revenue stream 
by measures other than unjustifiably abusing the intel-
lectual property right at the expense of competition and 
public welfare (Glasgow 2001). Therefore, pharmaceuti-
cal companies are encouraged to focus on specialty drugs 
with low substitution potential by creating the so-called 
“niche busters” (Dolgin 2010; Kakkar and Dahiya 2014). 
By focusing on niche market, companies can concentrate 
on their core competencies, thus freeing up the resources 
and getting rid of assets that have less importance for 
competing on a global scale. One example is the agree-
ment between Novartis and GlaxoSmithKline (GSK), 
whereby Novartis purchased the oncology business from 
GSK and GSK obtained the vaccine business in exchange.
Secondly, a substantial effort has been put into devel-
oping new business model and evaluating the legisla-
tive practice that suit the changed business environment 
(Rusu et  al. 2011). While the business environment has 
changed significantly, the respective business model 
has not kept pace. If revenues can only be sustained by 
exploiting the legislative loopholes, companies willing to 
invest in the development of medicine will face a serious 
dilemma on a long-term scale. Without proper policy 
intervention, the rise in patent challenges will not only 
shorten the effective market life, but also contribute to 
the dearth of high-risk and high-necessity drugs (Hig-
gins and Graham 2009). The predominant version of 
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current business model, at which an extensive market-
ing effort and sales presence are crucial for maintaining 
streams of revenue, will be less effective. In future, most 
medicines will likely be paid for on the basis of the results 
they deliver and pharmaceutical companies need to pur-
sue the path of “profiting together” instead of “profiting 
alone” by moving into health management space and to 
go beyond medicine (pwc 2009).
With rising R&D expenditure, it is important for phar-
maceutical companies to make positive returns from 
the innovation. This can be only achieved by improving 
both effectiveness and efficiency. The use of generics is 
expected to continue in the future, as the government 
promotes policies to use low-priced alternatives. Thus, 
innovator-companies need to combine various instru-
ments from the strategic tool box, which will be pre-
sented in the following, to achieve a balance between 
innovation and reward.
Strategic choices in the case of patent cliff
Research-driven pharmaceutical companies can employ 
a range of strategies to extend their existing patent pro-
tection on therapeutically active substances or pharma-
ceutical composition, thus maximizing the commercial 
value of the product and retaining its market share. Four 
generic strategic pathways exist, which can be considered 
as a point of departure for companies in outlining and 
devising their own strategies. Differing levels of strategic 
and marketing dimension define different landscape for 
action. For instance, considering the marketing mix from 
the 4P perspective (product, price, place and promotion), 
the variable “place”, which determines the intensity and 
manner how products will be made available (van Water-
schoot and Van den Bulte 1992), plays a minor role in 
the marketing of pharmaceuticals, since the prescription 
drug market is regulated by state authorities and there 
are hardly any entrepreneurial flexibility with regard to 
the distribution channel. Additionally, depending on the 
time period, a different mix of strategies is required to 
effectively prolong the life cycle of the drug and to balance 
risk and reward. In simplified terms, the strategic deci-
sions regarding the variable “product” need to be taken 
at an early stage, as the development of product innova-
tion usually takes time, while “promotion” and “price” can 
be adapted more flexible to the requirements and ambi-
ent conditions on short notice. Thus, determining which 
pathway to pursue depends largely on company’s existing 
capabilities, opportunities and priorities. Figure 2 gives an 
overview of the four generic strategic pathways.
In the following, the strategic options available to phar-
maceutical companies confronted with patent cliff are 
classified into above categorization and the resulting 
implications are discussed.
Prevention strategy
The first generic strategic orientation to extend the patent 
protection is to temporarily prevent or distort competi-
tion. The basic principle of ‘prevention strategy’ is there-
fore to exploit possibilities for extension of market 
exclusivity mostly by means of legal measures. One com-
monly applied strategy is related to strategic patenting. 
Patents are the primary tools that the research-driven 
companies use to establish and maintain their brands in 
the marketplace and provide a window of opportunity to 
enforce the exclusivity of the inventions (Cantrell 2009). 
Pharmaceutical industry has adopted a strategy of filing 
multiple patents to protect its branded drug. This practice 
of forming a network surrounding the base patent, is called 
creating “patent clusters”.2 The acquisition of secondary 
patents, obtaining features other than the main active drug 
ingredient (such as crystalline forms of the original com-
pound, methods of use or formulations), can create a solid 
portfolio covering different aspects of the drug (Burdon 
and Sloper 2003). For instance, if the manufacturing pro-
cess is optimized after filing a patent application so that 
the new synthesis method did not have to be disclosed at 
the time of initial filing, the related process patent, such as 
enhancing of purity level, can be filed at a later stage of the 
product lifecycle. Additionally, the primary patent may be 
split into several patents. One patent may seek protection 
for a broad genus encompassing various compounds, while 
another patent may comprise a claim related to a specific 
compound. In some cases, if one isomer3 is found to be 
more active than the other or offers substantial and previ-
ously unpredicted therapeutic advantages over others, it 
may provide a basis for a separate patenting for the more 
beneficial isomer (Hutchins 2003). Accordingly, secondary 
patents encompass inventions directed to the incremental 
2 Pharmaceutical products are usually protected by a large number of prod-
uct and process patents. Instead of facing single patent expiration, there are 
several successive ones. In most cases, there is one main patent protect-
ing the active compound and several secondary patents protecting aspects 
other than main patent. Upon patent expiry, if generic companies cannot 
find ways to bypass a patent protecting the supporting aspects, it can act as 
a competition limiting factor.
3 Chemical compounds often appear in different isomeric forms (i.e. hav-
ing the same chemical structure, but differs in spatial arrangement), such as 
cis/trans-isomers or enantiomers. Isomers may demonstrate different bio-
logical activity.
Choice of strategic 
pathway
Prevention Innovation Extraction Adaption
Fig. 2 Overview of the four generic strategic pathways [Source: 
modelled after Raasch (2006)]
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improvement of the primary patent and would permit the 
innovator-company to maintain the market share, even if 
the generic producers try to enter the market by contesting 
the validity of the primary patent. Amin and Kesselheim 
(2012) reported that a large cluster of secondary patents 
related to HIV medication (ritonavir) could delay generic 
competition 12 years after the expiration of the patents on 
the drug’s base compound. The Sector Inquiry by Euro-
pean Commission has revealed that there is a trend for 
companies to continuously file patent applications as the 
expiry date of the primary patent approaches, whereby the 
ratio of primary to secondary patents is 1:7. This kind of 
strategic patenting intends to build portfolios of patents 
for a defensive rather than for inventive purposes, placing 
the innovator-company in a more favorable position for 
the patent-related disputes concerning the launch of 
generics. Glasgow (2001) concludes: “[…] intellectual 
property protection is not being used to promote an incen-
tive to create and innovate. Rather, intellectual property 
rights are being used to gain and maintain an exclusive 
market share for the most profitable, not necessarily the 
most beneficial, drug”. Consequently, the term “evergreen-
ing” indicates the strategic maneuver to intentionally 
extend the market monopoly beyond the known patent life 
through secondary patenting (Dwivedi et  al. 2010). The 
consequent patent maze from secondary patents can result 
in difficulties for generic suppliers to determine when rele-
vant patents will expire and when it is safe to enter the 
market without inadvertently running into patent infringe-
ment problems. Even if the generic suppliers have success 
in maintaining a clear view through the multiple layers of 
patent protection, they find themselves at a disadvantage 
in that they might be prohibited from using the compound 
produced by the most economical route or using the most 
stable forms of the drug (Hutchins 2003). However, more 
recently, patent-related legal challenges from generic sup-
pliers have been more successful and the lead time for the 
market launch of generic products has become much 
shorter (European Commission 2009). The secondary pat-
ents may not cover the proposed generic product properly 
and are contestable (Glass 2004). At the same time, it is 
important to keep in mind that there is a tendency to 
restrict the patentability of secondary patents, especially in 
developing countries, leading to questionable patents on 
highly prolific medication to receive a strong second look. 
In brief, strategic patenting behavior can deter generic 
entry, as the costs to invent around or challenge the patent 
maze can be detrimental, but stricter patentability stand-
ards make the strategic patenting more vulnerable.
Another possibility to extend the market exclusivity by 
pursuing legal avenues is provided through obtaining of 
supplementary protection certificates (SPCs). SPCs are 
an additional protective mechanism introduced by EU to 
serve as an extension to the patent right (Hitchcock and 
Tugal 2003). For the pharmaceutical sector, SPCs can be 
issued to compensate the efforts put into research and 
development and the elapsed period between the patent 
filing and obtaining market authorization to place the 
approved drug on the market. SPCs extend the effective 
protection of products already on the market by a maxi-
mum of 5 years upon patent expiry. However, the protec-
tion granted through SPC can be legally challenged and 
declared as invalid. A similar practice has been adopted 
by US and Japan under the name of “patent term restora-
tion” in the 1980s. In US, the innovator-companies can 
apply for up to five additional years of patent protection 
for the new drug to make up for the time lost while the 
product was subject to the FDA’s regulatory review (Title 
II of the Hatch–Waxman Act) (Agrawal and Thakkar 
1997). Building on this legislation, brand owners can file 
a patent infringement suit, after an ANDA with para-
graph IV certification is filed by a generic manufacturer.4 
The FDA cannot approve the ANDA until the court deci-
sion, thereby leading up to 30 months extension of mar-
ket exclusivity (Bhat 2005).
Another way of extending the market exclusivity is to 
apply for orphan drug status. In EU, orphan drug status 
is granted to drugs for treating rare (life-threatening or 
chronically debilitating) diseases affecting not more than 
5 in 10,000 for which there is currently no adequate or 
possible treatment, while making them sufficiently profit-
able to bring to market (EMA 2015). Historically, a rare 
disease is not addressed by the pharmaceutical industry 
because of its small number of patients. The regulation 
encompassing the orphan drug designation in EU, which 
was laid down in early 2000, grants 10  years of market 
exclusivity, acceleration of the authorization procedure 
and reduction of administration fees (Haffner et al. 2008). 
In some cases, an already authorized medicinal product 
may seek accreditation for an as orphan drug designated 
indication. Due to the expanded range of application 
as well as the possibility to use the new indication as a 
distinguishing feature with respect to the generic com-
petitors, the turnover of the patent-free product can be 
maintained. However, attaining the orphan-drug-status 
cannot completely prevent the generic manufacturers 
from competing in the same market segment, since the 
prescriber can administer the generics in the category 
of “off-label” use. In contrast, the Orphan Drug Act has 
been in force since 1983 in US. The law provides several 
similar economic and regulatory incentives, including 
7 years of market exclusivity, fast-track approval and tax 
credit, to encourage the development of orphan drugs 
4 Paragraph IV Certification contains the claim of a generic firm that the 
patent of brand owner is not infringed or is invalid.
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(Minghetti et  al. 2000). However, it has been suggested 
that orphan drug regulations have not quite lived up to 
their expectations, thus the current regulations should be 
revised to provide improved incentives for industry and 
for better priority-setting of development (Tambuyzer 
2010). Besides, companies can be granted a 6-month pat-
ent term extension for submitting pediatric clinical trials 
(Kvesic 2008).
Generic entrants might challenge the validity of the 
patents enjoyed by the brand owner, either by entering 
the market at risk or taking the case to the court. In this 
context, the brand owner and generic companies are 
entitled to reach an out-of-court agreement and settle 
their patent litigation to avoid the costly expenses of pur-
suing legal action at court. In order to prevent generic 
entry, the brand owner agrees with generic competitors 
to not enter the market in return for substantial payment 
or conveniences, granting the equivalent of what they 
would have earned upon the market entry (Bulow 2004). 
This strategy is only applicable if the expected profit 
from the market dominance exceeds the payments. The 
generic competitors would stay out of the market for 
the duration of the agreements and the brand owner can 
enjoy an effect similar to successfully enforcing its patent 
right. However, out-of-court agreements between com-
panies in relation to patent litigation are not immune 
from competition law scrutiny (OECD 2014). Although 
companies have a legitimate interest in finding a mutu-
ally acceptable compromise through settlements, some 
form of settlements may be problematic from a competi-
tion law perspective. In recent years, the anticompetitive 
practices such as the pay-for-delay agreements in the 
context of patent settlement are under intensified moni-
toring of competition authorities and should be coor-
dinated with care, since they can entail the risk of high 
penalty payments and damage to company’s reputation 
and are detrimental to the interest of the communities 
(Table 2). 
Innovation strategy
The second generic strategic orientation is to avoid 
competition through product or business model inno-
vation. The basic principle of ‘innovation strategy’ is 
therefore to outpace the competition with a new move 
on the perceived value of a product or business model. 
Typically, the ability to continually innovate and actively 
provoking shifts in industry evolution are the hallmark 
of a successful outpacing strategy (Gilbert and Strebel 
1987). In this sense, product-related innovation strate-
gies comprise product-line extensions, approval in new 
indications, introduction of follow-on product and Rx-
to-OTC-Switch, which all build on company’s knowledge 
assets and assets complementary to them (e.g. structural 
assets).
Product-line extensions refer to a variation of the exist-
ing products by proactive measures aimed at advancing 
it. This implies that either the drug itself is altered or the 
product manufacturing procedure is improved to achieve 
a higher level of purity or to achieve cost saving potential 
(Dubey and Dubey 2009). In the first case, superior for-
mulations of the known compound can promote patient 
compliance through reduced dosing, new route of admin-
istration or improved compatibility (less side effects). 
After the patent expiration of the blockbuster drug Pro-
zac® (fluoxetine) in 2001, Eli Lilly obtained patent protec-
tion for the combined use of olanzapine and fluoxetine 
(Symbyax®) for treatment of refractory depression. The 
patent of this new combination drug ends in 2017. This 
kind of product bundling approach is a popular mecha-
nism to prolong the product lifecycle, since the bundling 
can facilitate the leveraging of market power from one to 
another. Pfizer’s Procardia XL® is a result of line exten-
sion with controlled-release formulation for the treat-
ment of arterial hypertension. Such reformulations build 
on same active ingredient of the original drug and have a 
shorter approval path. Hong et al. (2005) reported that a 
product-line extension helps to maintain the price level 
to a reasonable extent despite the entry of generic suppli-
ers. Moreover, the shift from racemic mixture, compound 
consisting of an equal mixture of a pair of enantiomers, 
to a single isomer can entail potential for an improved 
drug efficacy or less complex pharmacokinetic and phar-
macodynamic profile. One example is Prilosec® (omepra-
zole) from AstraZeneca. The company has successfully 
marketed Nexium®, which is the single (S)-enantiomer of 
omeprazole, as an extension.
Indication extension refers to the practice of identify-
ing novel ways of application for an existing drug. In the 
course of clinical use, effects and accompanying symp-
toms of the drug, which were not manifested during the 
clinical study and not familiar at the time of registration, 
become clear. If the resulting evidence on possible new 
indications appears to be promising, an extension of the 
drug approval may be requested. Upon receiving approval 
for reformulation or new indications, innovator-company 
can acquire at least 3-years of market exclusivity (Bhat 
2005). In this manner, the innovator-company can gain a 
distinguishing feature towards the generic competition. 
Drugs with multiple indications naturally have a higher 
chance of competing in different market. A crucial factor 
in the implementation of product-line extension strategy 
is the patentability of the product. Upon obtaining pro-
tection of the subsequent product innovation, it is much 
easier to convince a certain amount of price insensitive 
Page 8 of 14Song and Han  SpringerPlus  (2016) 5:692 
customer segment of the superiority of the modified 
drug.
The most promising, but the most difficult strategy to 
implement is the introduction of a follow-on product, 
which is either therapeutically or technologically innova-
tive and permits better patient outcomes. The underly-
ing rationale behind this strategy is to transfer the brand 
reputation as well as the patient base to the follow-on 
product in order to make up for the losses of sales. A key 
success factor for the implementation of this strategy is 
the interplay between two factors: price sensitivity of the 
market and the expected degree of improvements of drug 
profile. Without any significant improvements over its 
predecessor, it is extremely difficult to persuade the pre-
scribers to switch to a follow-on product. The introduc-
tion of a less innovative follow-on product often receives 
harsh criticism from politics and funding bodies and is 
subject to substantial regulatory drawbacks. Another 
important question is whether the follow-on product 
should be promoted in a complementary or substitutive 
relationship. The sales volume following the introduction 
of a new product often has a cannibalizing effect on the 
predecessor product, but the parallel offering can avoid 
the risk of replacing a renowned product, which gener-
ates certain carry-over revenue without any further cost 
or effort. Therefore, it is advisable to grant a consolida-
tion phase so that the full utilization of potential turnover 
of the previous product is not unnecessarily shortened 
and there is sufficient time for transition and establish-
ment of the follow-on product on the market.
Switching the prescription drug (Rx) to an over-the-
counter (OTC) drug may provide a new venue for sus-
tained revenue, as switching is synonymous with the 
expansion of market segment, brought about through 
changes of a legal status and a business strategy. Herein, 
the switch means the removal of the active pharma-
ceutical ingredient from prescription-only status. The 
innovator-company can either transfer the prescription 
drug into an OTC status by weakening the dosages or 
by solely providing the drug in OTC form. The ration-
ale underpinning the OTC-switch is the idea that the 
patients, who had positive experience with the branded 
drug, are potentially more brand-loyal in terms of prod-
uct-choice. The market for OTC drug might be a more 
beneficial playing ground for the brand owner to exploit 
the value of the brand despite the expiry of patent pro-
tection. Choosing this strategic path may create new rev-
enue opportunities by diversifying the customer base and 
benefit consumers with more accessible and affordable 
self-care solutions. However, the switching of Rx–OTC 
is not always practicable. The switch process is highly 
regulated and scientifically rigorous. For a medicine to 
be granted OTC status, it must demonstrate a wide safety 
margin and be effective, and must bear understandable 
labeling to ensure proper use (CHPA 2015). Furthermore, 
the OTC-business is characterized by low price levels and 
heavy advertising. Spillover effect between OTC and pre-
scription drug, brand’s strength and marketing expertise 
for OTC-business constitute key success factors. At pre-
sent, OTC might be a viable option in a country, where 
the access to appropriate medicine without prescription 
empowers the consumers to take control over their self-
care needs.
Business model-related strategy comprises the rea-
lignment of structure and governance of transactions 
designed to create and capture value through an inter-
related set of decision variables. Many firms do not sur-
vive in the long term despite their product innovation 
capabilities. The answer is clear: they failed to adjust their 
business models to changing environment. The literature 
Table 2 Overview of prevention strategies
Strategic options Description Exclusivity period Source
Strategic patenting (“later 
issued patents”)
Obtaining patent protection on different aspects around 
the base compound patent
20 years from the date of filing Hutchins (2003), Burdon 
and Sloper (2003)
Patent term restoration Granting of additional market exclusivity for the time lost 
due to FDA approval process (Title II of Hatch–Waxman 
Act)
Maximum of 5 years Agrawal and Thakkar 
(1997)
SPC Protective mechanism serving as an extension to patent 
right
Maximum of 5 years Hitchcock and Tugal 
(2003)
30‑month stay provision Filing a patent infringement suit to fight ANDA 30 months from the date of 
notice or till court decision
Bhat (2005)
Orphan drug Applying for orphan drug status for an already authorized 
drug
7 years of market exclusivity in US, 
10 years in EU
Haffner et al. (2008), Ming‑
hetti et al. (2000)
Pediatric exclusivity Submission of pediatric clinical trials on the FDA’s request 6 months of market exclusivity Kvesic (2008)
Patent settlement agree‑
ments
Involving in settlements with generic manufacturers to 
delay the market entry
Duration of the agreement Bulow (2004)
Page 9 of 14Song and Han  SpringerPlus  (2016) 5:692 
has focused primarily on strategies related to product 
modification and marketing to fend off generic competi-
tion. A structured approach from the perspective of busi-
ness model is so far neglected. A business model can be 
defined as “the logic, the data and other evidence that 
support a value proposition for the customer, and a viable 
structure of revenues and costs for the enterprise deliv-
ering that value” (Teece 2010). Visualizing it not only 
allows companies to get a holistic picture of the business 
by explaining how the firm is embedded in, and interacts 
with its surrounding ecosystem, but can also demonstrate 
the logical gaps that exist (Zott et al. 2011). The prevailing 
blockbuster business model that has driven the pharma-
ceutical industry over the last few decades is increasingly 
out of alignment with the technical discontinuities and 
changing social demands. Research focus is slowly being 
redirected away from blockbuster products towards ther-
apies for stratified groups of patients, as the concept of 
personalized medicine promises a patient-centered clini-
cal practice while improving the drug efficiency (Mittra 
and Tait 2012). Value creation in the pharmaceutical 
industry proceeds in a non-linear fashion with distinct 
inflection points. Strategic differences at firm-level may 
no longer be appropriate to homogenize the industry 
(Mittra 2007). The preferred balance between value pro-
vision and value gain depends on the distinct situational 
contexts within which the companies find themselves 
embedded. Since there is an increasing diversity in the 
strategic profile and innovation process, the vertically 
integrated value chain might transform into a service- 
or product platform-oriented business model by either 
producing diagnostic devices that aid the understand-
ing of pharmacogenomics profile or by focusing on the 
discovery and pre-clinical development of active com-
pound with a view to license it (Bigliardi et al. 2005). As 
the healthcare landscape is shifting towards the promise 
of personalized medicine and outcome-based reimburse-
ments, a value capturing along the dimension of business 
model could deserve some reflection (Table 3).
Extraction strategy
The third generic strategy is to fully exploit the current 
market position without making additional investments 
in the product innovation. Two conceptually different 
strategic approaches can be subsumed under this cat-
egory. The first strategic approach is the continuation of 
existing product line without any further modifications 
of the product offering. This strategy is aimed at secur-
ing the product turnover for as long as possible by meas-
ures related to marketing campaign or pricing strategies 
as well as cutting the product-related expenses before 
or with the expiration of the patent. In the first instance, 
the patent holder hopes to mitigate the declining sales 
volume by adjusting strategies along the dimensions of 
“price” and “promotion”. Brand owners normally decrease 
the price to compete directly with generics, but can also 
increase the price to reach the price-insensitive segment 
of the market (Grabowski and Vernon 2000; Chandon 
2004). Ching (2010) confirmed that myopic firms would 
set higher prices to maximize short-term profit, as the 
incentive becomes smaller over time with uncertainty 
about the generic quality slowly resolving. However, 
these only have a marginal effect of delaying the decline 
in sales. Sooner or later, these strategies need to be aban-
doned, as the increasing costs of the measures would not 
justify the additional revenues generated through promo-
tional campaign in the long term. Even though, the price 
is rather a simple and easy to customize dimension, there 
is still limited price sensitivity on the side of consumers 
(patients) and the decision makers (prescriber), because 
it is normally the statutory health insurance, which ulti-
mately bears the costs and determines the price struc-
ture. Nevertheless, the pace and extent of the decline in 
sales is closely related to the existing price differential. 
It is therefore important for the brand owners to make 
hypotheses about the entry-level price of the generic 
drugs, because the care providers take account of the 
price ratio involved for the patient when writing the pre-
scriptions for medication or specialized care. A reactive 
or retroactive price adjustment allows generic suppliers 
to establish themselves in the market at an early stage. 
Since the recapturing of the lost market share is complex, 
brand owners have to deal with the price adjustment 
several months prior to the patent expiry as a pro-active 
contribution to the marketing strategy. In addition, a 
price reduction may adversely affect the international 
price grid, as it can trigger parallel export to countries, 
where the drug is still protected by a patent (Raasch 
2009). Consequently, it is critical to anticipate the favora-
ble price ratio for the implementation of price reduction 
strategy. The brand owner must take into account that 
generic providers are also willing to cut down the prices 
in order to maintain an adequate level of price gap. For 
example, the extraordinary success of the drug Neu-
rontin after its patent expiration lies in the fact that the 
generic product was only about 15 % lower priced than 
its original—a difference, for which the prescribers can 
waive the use of generics. On the other side, the generic 
version of Pfizer’s Lipitor Atorvastatin Hexal® offered a 
price advantage of up to 85 % upon its launching. Hence, 
the company must be aware of its own limit to effectively 
participate in a price war against the generic producers. 
Moreover, the patent holder can intentionally defer the 
marketing expenses and reduces expenditures on inter-
nal and external sales force dedicated to the blockbuster 
drug. The goal here is to let the product phase out with 
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the loss of market exclusivity. Thus, no resources are 
being poured into combating the generic competitors, 
as the chances of success appear to be low. The product 
still can generate a certain turnover with “loyal prescrib-
ers”, who do not shift their patients to low cost alterna-
tives. In such cases, the company does not wish to strive 
for a strong presence in the product line concerned and 
has to accept that sooner or later it will confronted with 
a substantial sales drop. The second strategic approach 
under this category is the selling or licensing a patent 
to generic suppliers before the patent expiry. Instead of 
a controlled, strategic withdrawal from the product line, 
the selling or out-licensing of compounds (existing pat-
ent right and trademark) to other entities may turn out 
to be more appropriate. Licensing might benefit the pat-
ent holder through externalities from standards creation 
or from access to the licensee’s complementary technolo-
gies (Somaya 2003). Moreover, it might be attractive to 
out-license the drug to another company to explore for 
alternate indications. Chong and Sullivan (2007) argued 
that “repurposing” of old drug has proved successful in 
bringing new therapies and there are approximately 8850 
unique drugs worth of screening. The detailed specifica-
tions of such licensing agreements are diverse, whereby 
it is necessary to make the fundamental decision as to 
whether the innovator-company wants to participate 
in the product success by covering a part of the risk or 
whether it prefers to transfer the right against the one-off 
payment. For smaller companies with a scarcity of avail-
able products, the residual potential of the blockbuster 
drug is an important incentive for active commerciali-
zation. An authorized generic entry is profitable, if the 
licensing income exceeds the losses resulting from the 
generic entry. The first-mover advantage often grants a 
sustainable competitive edge over subsequent entrants 
(Hollis 2002). Hence, the pricing process must be criti-
cally reviewed, especially as early entries can be accom-
panied by the aggressive development of market prices 
and heavy losses of sales of branded drugs. Reaching 
an early entry agreement is also known to be critically 
involved in affecting the attractiveness of subsequent 
generic entry and decreasing the intensity of off-patent 
competition (Table 4).
Adaption strategy
The last generic strategic pathway is to introduce 
branded generics by establishing itself as an active player 
in the generic market. Two conceptually similar strategic 
alternatives fall into this category: (1) developing a low-
cost alternative in the form of wholly owned subsidiary 
focusing on generic drugs, which operates separately 
outside the main organization (Gilbert and Strebel 1987); 
(2) offering of a generic through the innovator-company 
itself (Agrawal and Thakkar 1997). The basic principle 
of ‘adaption strategy’ is therefore to retain existing cus-
tomer base through an active entry into the business 
of generic drug and to capture a share of the generic 
profits. In small markets, branded generics may deter 
generic entry, as they have a manufacturing advantage. 
The underlying rationale behind the launch of generic by 
subsidiaries is to leverage synergies and to diversify the 
product portfolio by having a strong presence in differ-
ent key markets. In the past, the attempt to gather the 
innovator-company and generic suppliers under the same 
roof ended up with failure. This comes from the circum-
stance that the generic business requires short reporting 
and decision-making channels as well as the competence 
in market research and admission process rather than in 
R&D. Exploring the fit between the internal organization 
and its business model has a significant impact on firm 
performance (White 1986). But today, many established 
brands have their own generic subsidiary (e.g. Sandoz 
from Novartis Group) and intentionally separate branded 
and generic divisions in order to provide an enhanced 
ability to respond to market dynamics.
The launch of a “second brand” (a so-called fighter 
brand) with an additional branded product sold at 
a discounted price under its own corporate brand is 
Table 3 Overview of innovation strategies
Strategic options Description Exclusivity period Source
Product‑line exten‑
sion
Extensions of existing drug (e.g. reformulations 
and combination drugs); improvement over the 
predecessor
Depending on the patentability of the prod‑
uct/3 years of market exclusivity for extensions 
involving clinical research
Bhat (2005), Dubey 
and Dubey (2009)
New indications Finding new potential usage by extending the 
therapeutic indication of the drug
3 years of market exclusivity Bhat (2005)
Introduction of 
follow‑on products
Introduction of next‑generation drug; demonstra‑
tion of improved properties
Depending on the patentability of the product Agrawal and Thakkar 
(1997)
Rx‑to‑OTC‑switch Switching a prescription drug to OTC status; 




Altering the firm’s core logic for creating and cap‑
turing value by specifying the value chain
– Mittra and Tait (2012)
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frequently discussed as a potentially promising new stra-
tegic option, but has been rarely implemented because of 
its credibility for the external world. Raasch (2008) con-
firmed that the rationale behind the launch of a fighter 
brand is “a segmentation of demand according to price 
sensitivity, maintaining a higher profit margin on the 
units sold […] but not entirely losing more price-sensi-
tive prescribers”. Similarly, a company considering the 
launch of a fighter brand can receive following competi-
tive advantages: (1) brand popularity and reputation as 
the producer of the proven drug will likely benefit the 
new brand; (2) the brand owner can take advantages of 
already existing manufacturing infrastructure to profit 
from learning curve-based cost advantages (Raasch 
2008). A downside would be the fact that the commer-
cialization of low-priced products is often incompat-
ible with the corporate image as well as culture and the 
business model of the research-driven company. Also 
it would generate a cannibalizing effect on the original 
drug. The critical issue for implementing this strategy is 
whether the discounted drug should substitute the high-
priced branded drug or both are expected to complement 
one another. In both cases, it opens up the possibility of 
securing a part of the market falling to generics, thereby 
exploiting the experience-related advantages in the syn-
thesis and packaging of the drug and contributes to the 
coordinated utilization of existing production capacities. 
However, the first approach can gain a substantial mar-
ket share, only if the subsidiary brings its generic to the 
market in the course of early entry before other generic 
competitors, thereby realizing the first-mover advantage. 
Therefore, it is imperative to consider the likely devel-
opment of the price corridor after the generic entry. A 
proactive pricing behavior and an aggressive marketing 
communication towards the prescribers would positively 
contribute to the success of launching secondary brand 
product (Table 5).
To prolong the effective patent life for the drug beyond 
the expiry date of the patent, companies can take various 
pathways defined by the different stages of the product 
lifecycle (Chandon 2004). Determining which pathway 
to pursue depends on company’s capabilities, priorities 
and the chosen time period. Not all options are available 
at a given time. There are distinct phases of product life-
cycle of the blockbuster drug to consider, if one wishes 
to extend its period during which they can shield from 
generic competition. A healthy mix of innovative and leg-
islative efforts to promote pharmaceutical innovation is 
the key ingredient in enabling the company to generate a 
platform for future growth and to preserve market domi-
nance after patent expiration. An important determinant 
for success within the framework of innovation strategy 
is not only to innovate, but also to successfully patent the 
inventive output. Therefore, scientist and patent lawyers 
need to communicate and cooperate effectively in order 
to identify a common denominator. Pharmaceutical sci-
entists are in need of having a better understanding of the 
patent fundamentals, as they often do not realize that an 
improvement they made could be a patentable subject 
matter. A lack of interaction between these two groups 
and understanding of each culture may lead to missed 
opportunities in terms of competitiveness that are both 
impeding and costly to the firm development (Fig. 3).
A framework for designing various strategic possi-
bilities been compiled. Taken together, it creates a large 
strategic diversity for the incumbent company and adds 
to the complexity of designing ideal patent expiration 
strategies. For some companies, the remaining time until 
the patent expiry may not be sufficient or the necessary 
investment may be too high to allow appropriate adjust-
ments to be made in time or pursuing a certain strategy 
may appear to be not in accordance with the manage-
ment philosophy. The dynamics of drug prices and the 
competition by generic drugs vary also significantly 
across cultures (Magazzini et  al. 2004). The profitabil-
ity of early entry (“authorized generics”) or launching of 
“fighter brand” depends significantly on the accuracy 
of the firm’s forecasting capabilities. Replacement of 
branded product by follow-on product and the product 
modification strategies are generally employed through 
secondary patenting. Innovation strategy requires a suf-
ficient lead time, a multidisciplinary approach and a well-
coordinated program for efficient processing. Therefore, 
the prevention and innovation strategy need to be per-
formed both in sequence and in parallel. The interplay 
among various strategies should be constantly reassessed 
Table 4 Overview of extraction strategies
Strategic options Description Effect Source
Continuation of existing 
product line
Leverage promotional campaign and pricing strategies to maximize  
the potential turnover
Short‑term Kvesic (2008), Raasch (2009)
Differentiation Competitive advantage through brand recognition; strong brand image Mid‑term Agrawal and Thakkar (1997)
Exit strategy ‘Milking’ of the product; letting the product slowly phase out Short‑term Chandon (2004)
Licensing Licensing or selling of the exclusive rights to generic manufacturers Short‑term Glasgow (2001)
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in order to offer the best competitive defense. Translating 
a strategic orientation into an actual advantage requires 
further choices about how much investment to make and 
what approach should be taken. Thus, a firm must iden-
tify its current position and requires a careful assessment 
of one’s capabilities and limits. In total, a greater empha-
sis has been placed on employing combined lifecycle 
management strategies by research-driven pharmaceuti-
cal companies, as generic competition becomes stronger 
and more sophisticated. The case of patent cliff should be 
perceived as “social laboratory” predicting future trends 
in industrial dynamics and competition in the pharma-
ceutical industry and as such it is a model for outcome-
based payments for some aspects. Hence, it is important 
that societal consensus is maintained for solutions in this 
area, and multi-stakeholder platforms (including policy 
makers, payers and industry representatives) should 
work on improving communication and awareness of the 
issue by collaboration and by sharing expertise.
Conclusions
The patent expiry is one of the most important events 
within the life cycle of pharmaceutical products. In view 
of diminishing product pipeline, a growing significance 
is attached to the active marketing of the existing prod-
ucts—even beyond the expiry of patent protection. As it 
is becoming increasingly difficult for major pharmaceuti-
cal companies to continuously develop new blockbuster 
drugs on a regular basis, companies can consider devel-
oping their own generic versions of blockbuster drug to 
minimize the loss to their brand or offer promotional 
consumer discounts by reinventing themselves as a more 
customer-centric organization. The development of an 
extension strategy requires an intensive interplay among 
Table 5 Overview of adaption strategies
Strategic options Description Effect Source
Branded generics (1) Offering generic through subsidiary “First mover advantage”; serving different markets Gilbert and Strebel (1987)
Branded generics (2) Offering generic through brand owner Serving different customer segments Raasch (2008)
Fig. 3 Framework of the strategic and tactical design possibilities in the pharmaceutical industry (Source: own figure)
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following components. (1) A thorough understanding of 
the business environment and anticipation of possible 
shifts in the pattern of industry dynamics; (2) devising 
strategies that deliver a competitive advantage for per-
ceived value (e.g. product dimension) or delivered cost 
(e.g. price dimension); (3) promoting the collaboration 
between scientists, attorneys and marketing manager in 
order to make maximum use of a global view of prod-
uct lifecycle management; (4) a combination of product 
modification, promotional and pricing strategies. Most 
strategies involve interdisciplinary knowledge on market-
ing, intellectual property rights and technologies. Future 
research in these areas may benefit from the extensive lit-
erature on technology and innovation marketing in other 
industries. Moreover, the discussed strategies are mostly 
based on non-biologic drugs. The approval processes for 
biosimilars (generics of biologics) are subject to different 
technical and legal procedures, which are more complex 
in general. A comprehensive analysis dedicated to bio-
similar market is needed to address these questions in a 
significant manner. In addition, little attention has been 
paid to how an optimal pricing, promotion and divesti-
ture process might look like and when to implement a 
mixed-strategy and when not. Thus, firm’s knowledge, 
reputational and relational assets should be carefully 
managed in a coherent manner to aid the decision-mak-
ing process.
An open question is how aggressively brand owners are 
willing to support the drug with investments aimed at dif-
ferentiating it from generic competitors. Branded phar-
maceuticals have certain attributes that lead to different 
patterns of losing market share after they go off patent. 
A rapid erosion of market share is more likely to occur, 
if drugs are easier to replicate or are less subject to man-
aged care control (Tuttle et al. 2004). Thus, the challenge 
lies not only in evaluating the potential, but also in arriv-
ing at a reliable forecast. Given the wide range of possi-
ble outcomes upon facing generic entry, understanding 
the specific attributes and their relationship to the brand’s 
intrinsic potential are critical to make the right strate-
gic decisions about post-patent expiry and to sustain the 
franchise. Hence, the innovator-company needs to treat 
patent-related (i.e. regulatory) and factual strategies both 
as weapon and a shield to outpace the generic competi-
tion. The product-related strategies need to be supported 
by a consistent pricing and promotional strategy. Within 
a firm, several departments are involved in making deci-
sions that related to strategic balancing of market exclu-
sivity, but not every department has the same knowledge 
or awareness of the strategic possibilities of prolonging 
the product life (Dolfsma 2011). The provided scheme can 
serve as a fertile ground for assessing the suitability of the 
measures chosen to achieve the desired objective, broad-
ening company’s perspectives and consensus-building for 
addressing the issues arising from the patent expiry. Pat-
ent expiration is not the end of the product life, but with a 
proper balancing, it can be a second beginning.
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